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Abstract: Some philosophers suggest that a minimal form of self-awareness is an integral 
element of the way in which all experiences are given (SPC: self-presenting claim). The main 
argument for this is that the phenomenological quality of ‘mineness’ of the experience reveals 
the self as a part of all experiences. Since the sense of mineness is taken as intrinsic to the 
givenness of the experience, it counts as an argument for the SPC. In this essay, I assess this 
claim and its main argument. After describing the phenomenological approach to self-
awareness that grounds the discussion, I comment on some pathological cases that challenge 
the SPC. After this, I examine the standard reply in defence of the SPC and I focus the 
discussion on cases of thought insertion. I conclude that although the standard reply adds 
interesting elements to the general discussion, it becomes philosophically problematic 
especially when it tries to deal with cases of thought insertion. 
Keywords: Self-Awareness, Phenomenal Consciousness, Thought Insertion, Self-
Presenting Claim, Phenomenological Approach to Self-awareness, Zahavi 
Introduction 
Some psychiatrists and philosophers have claimed that conscious experience has a 
‘self-presenting’ character. This self-presenting claim can be stated as follows: 
SPC: A minimal form of self-awareness is always given as an integral element of the 
intrinsic intentional structure of all experiences. Phenomenal consciousness always involves 
self-awareness. 
One of the main arguments for the SPC is that the phenomenological quality of 
‘being mine’ of the experience reveals the subject of that experience as an integral 
part of its givenness (Zahavi & Parnas 1998; Zahavi 2005; Gallagher 2012)1. Since 
the sense of mineness is taken as a constant feature of this givenness, it counts as an 
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argument for the SPC. In this context, no experience lacks the sense of mineness and 
all experiences are self-presenting. In this chapter, I shall assess these ideas. After 
providing some background for the discussion, I discuss some pathological cases 
that challenge the SPC. I then examine the standard defence of the SPC and I focus 
the discussion on cases of thought insertion. I conclude that although the reply adds 
interesting elements to the discussion, it is philosophically problematic and, for this 
reason, the main argument for the SPC is not compelling. 
Zahavi’s Phenomenological Approach to Self-Awareness 
Dan Zahavi has become one of the main defenders of the SPC. He suggests that to 
have a conscious experience of, let’s say, X is also to have a degree of awareness of 
one’s self as the subject experiencing X (Zahavi & Parnas 1998, 691; Zahavi 2005, 
Chapter 5). For instance, while listening to a song, I am also aware that I am the one 
listening to that song. This does not seem controversial. However, Zahavi adds: 
“The ‘I’, the subject of self-awareness is simply a feature of the givenness of the 
experiencer” (Zahavi 2002, 697)2. 
Here, Zahavi suggests that the subject of the experience is integral to the way in 
which experience are subjectively given, i.e. the subject of the experience is an 
inherent and primitive element of the experiential stream and its natural 
appearance (Zahavi 2000; 2012)3. Zahavi suggests that one arrives at this conception 
of self-awareness simply by inspecting the structure of conscious experiences 
(Zahavi 2005, Chapter 1). Quite interestingly, according to Zahavi, this primitive 
self-awareness is ‘pre-reflective’, i.e. prior to any reflection on the experience and 
existing as a ‘background presence’ in the givenness of all experiences (Zahavi 2005, 
115-146; Gallagher 2012, 127-130). This pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes the 
foundation for any type of reflective self-awareness (Gallagher and Zahavi 2010, 4). 
In this context, Zahavi seems to use the term ‘pre-reflective’ to describe a type of 
‘unattended’ awareness of one’s self that is part of the structure of the way in which 
experience appears to us. At least, this is the impression he gives when – following 
Husserl – he states that:  
 “Self-consciousness, rather than being something that occurs during exceptional 
circumstances, namely whenever we pay attention to our conscious life, is a feature 
characterizing subjectivity as such, no matter what worldly entities it might 
otherwise be conscious of and occupied with” (Zahavi 2005, 11)4. 
In his work, Zahavi does not deny the existence of a ‘higher order’ self-awareness. 
However, he suggests that the pre-reflective type is a necessary condition for any 
other type of higher order self-awareness that Zahavi calls ‘reflective self-
awareness’. Let’s contrast these two types of self-awareness: 
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(a) On the one hand, the so-called ‘reflective self-awareness’ is the product of 
directing our attention to the structure of our own occurrent mental states. This 
would imply a certain degree of cognitive and representational processing (Zahavi 
2005). However, according to Zahavi, this takes us away from the most 
fundamental nature of self-awareness, namely, its pre-reflective givenness. Zahavi 
seems to understandthe term ‘reflective’ in a Lockean sense i.e. as the mind’s ability 
to turn its gaze inward upon itself (self-directedness), becoming the object of its 
contemplation (Locke 1975, 107). As a result of directing our attention to a certain 
mental state, we can reflectively be aware that we are in that mental state. An 
example of this type of self-awareness would be the so-called ‘narrative self-
awareness’ (Gallagher 2000; Zahavi 2007). 
(b) On the other hand, the ‘pre-reflective’ type is understood as an ‘unattended’ 
awareness of one’s self that is ‘always present’ as an element of the common way in 
which experiences are given before directing our attention to them. Zahavi 
understands this type of self-awareness as part of the givenness of experience. The 
term ‘pre-reflective’ takes two meanings in this context: ‘(1) it is an [unattended] 
awareness we have before we do any reflecting on our experience; (2) it is an 
implicit and first-order awareness rather than an explicit or higher-order form of 
self-consciousness’ (Zahavi & Gallagher 2010, 1). According to Zahavi, we do not 
need to do any reflection on the structure of experience in order to be pre-
reflectively aware that we are the ones undergoing our experiences. Zahavi claims 
that the ‘reflective self-awareness’ just thematizes an awareness that belongs to the 
very same structure in which experience intentionally is, and hence: “an explicit 
reflective self-consciousness is possible only because there is a pre-reflective self-
awareness that is an ongoing and more primary self-consciousness […]” (Ibid). 
Finally, Zahavi states the relation between reflective and pre-reflective self-
awareness as follows: “Rather, the point is that this reflective self-awareness is 
derivative, and that it always presupposes the existence of a prior unthematic, non-
objectifying, pre-reflective self-awareness as its condition of possibility” (Zahavi 
2002, 17).  
Some philosophers will deny the notion of ‘pre-reflective self-awareness’ (see 
Metzinger 2003; Rosenthal 1997). But we might all agree that for any conscious 
experience it is possible to reflect on it and to become aware of it as our own 
experience. However, this is not what Zahavi has in mind. Zahavi’s claim is more 
controversial; he suggests that the reason why this is true is because of the existence 
of a pre-reflective self-awareness that is part of the structure of the givenness of the 
experience. However, it is reasonable to say that this idea requires further 
considerations. For instance, Thomas Metzinger (2003) does not deny the existence 
of a reflective self-awareness when we reflect on our experiences. However, he says 
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that this self-awareness has nothing to do with pre-reflective preconditions since it 
is an illusion created by a self-system. The main idea is that experience itself does 
not have a self-presenting structure and therefore, we cannot attribute to it any type 
of self-awareness as integral to its givenness. Let’s now examine Zahavi’s main 
argument for his claim. 
Self-Awareness and Sense of Mineness 
Zahavi proposes that in order to be reflectively aware of ourselves, we need to be 
familiarized with ourselves in a more fundamental way, namely, with our own 
ongoing experiencing. In Zahavi’s view, the SPC is revealed through the analysis of 
the concept of pre-reflective self-awareness. According to Zahavi, the way in which 
experiences are given contains certain basic phenomenological features. These 
features are ‘pre-reflective’ in the sense that they are prior to any reflection on the 
experience, and the most important of which is the so-called ‘sense of mineness’. 
This will be Zahavi’s main argument for the SPC.  
Zahavi (2005) suggests that the different modes of givenness of the experience 
(imaginative, perceptual, cognitive, etc.) share a common feature. All of them are 
marked as seeming to be my experiences; all of them have a ‘sense of ownership or 
mineness’. Gallagher & Zahavi (2010) claim that: “the experience [always] happens 
in an immediate way and it is implicitly marked as my experiencer”  (Gallagher & 
Zahavi 2010,1)5. Zahavi  writes: 
“Thus, whenever I experience something, my self […] is present and is, so to speak, 
therefore implicated. The experiences do not simply pass me by, as if they were 
foreign entities, but rather they are exactly mine” (Zahavi 2005, 81). 
Zahavi claims that the sense of mineness is intrinsic to all experiences in the sense 
that: ‘whether a certain experience is experienced as mine or not, however, depends 
not on something apart from the experience, but precisely on the givenness of the 
experience’ (Ibid, 124). Importantly, Zahavi suggests that the sense of mineness of 
the experiences captures an immediate and non-observational access to oneself. 
Since this property is pre-reflective and reveals the self as a part of the structure of 
any experience, the sense of mineness is taken as an argument to say that conscious 
experience is self-presenting.  
In sum, the sense of mineness is taken as intrinsic to the structure of the givenness 
of all experience (all experiences are given as mine) and it needs to be taken as an 
argument for the claim that suggests that a minimal self-awareness is revealed as a 
structural constant of the givenness of experience. This is because the sense of 
mineness presents the experiences as being mine, i.e. presenting me as the subject 
of those experiences. 
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Disrupted Sense of Mineness and the SPT 
It is hard to imagine what abnormal mental phenomena feel like. However, it is 
widely agreed that abnormal experiences constitute a valuable contribution to 
understating the most essential features of phenomenal consciousness and self-
awareness (Parnas & Zahavi 2003). These reports have been taken as a plausible 
way of testing theories in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, neuroscience and 
cognitive science (Gallagher 2000; Parnas & Zahavi 2000; Metzinger 2003, 439). 
Conversely, a theory which fails to accommodate pathological cases may be 
problematic. 
In the context of our discussion, pathological cases confront us with situations that 
challenge the argument from the sense of mineness. Since our discussion of the SPC 
concerns the way in which experiences are given to us, it is extremely important to 
pay careful attention to the phenomenology of these cases in order to raise plausible 
conclusions on this debate. In this section, I shall examine the claim that no 
experience lacks the ‘sense of ownership’ that underlies the SPC. There seem to exist 
an important number of empirical cases that suggest that it is possible to have 
experiences with no sense of mineness and therefore, that the argument from the 
sense of mineness is false. The most challenging cases come from people suffering 
from thought insertion in schizophrenia. For this reason, let me start with the 
weaker cases to finally focus our discussion on cases of disrupted experiences of 
thinking.   
Disrupted Bodily awareness 
Bodily awareness denotes a certain type of experience that presents our body from 
the first person perspective, including proprioception, kinaesthetic experiences, 
bodily sensations and the sense of balance (Martin 1995).  Usually, we experience a 
sense of mineness with respect to the experience of a body part, i.e. in normal cases 
the experience of our body part is marked as mine. However, there are cases in 
which this condition is not met, which suggests that this property would not be 
constant in the givenness of experience, contrary to Zahavi’s proposal. For instance, 
people suffering from somatoparaphrenic delusion deny the sense of mineness of 
the experience of a certain body part. With the lack of this experiential property, 
patients attribute the ownership to someone else or they personify it. In these cases, 
patients receive sensory stimulation from the alien body part; however, the 
experience of that body part lacks the sense of mineness, i.e. the experience of the 
alien limb is not marked as their own. Phenomenologically, patients suffering from 
this delusion experience some body part as not theirs. We might suggest that the 
lack of the experiential quality of mineness plus a delusional general state makes 
the patient claim that the owner of that certain body part is someone other than the 
patient. A similar case – and perhaps clearer – is given by the alien hand syndrome 
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in which patients although feeling the sensational properties of a body part, do not 
experience the body part as their own6. Patients suffering from this condition deny 
the sense of ownership for the experience of a body part. 
These cases give us prima facie evidence to suppose that at the phenomenological 
level, the sense of mineness can be somehow dissociated from a certain type of 
experience. This last distinction is important because Zahavi seems build his whole 
account specifically at the phenomenological level. If we take the reports of these 
patients at face value, we might suggest that: ‘such people experience bodily 
sensation in a limb that they do not experience as their own. That is, they posses 
bodily-awareness without a sense of ownership’ (Smith 2013, 10). Although these 
patients have sensorial inputs, these inputs do not imply the patients having the 
experience of the body part with a sense of mineness.  
Disrupted Action Awareness 
In normal cases, we feel a sense of mineness attached to our conscious actions. 
Usually, from the first person perspective, the awareness of an action reveals the 
action as mine. However, there are cases in which this experience is disrupted. Biran 
et al present the following case: 
“JC [56-year-old right-handed man] attributed wishes and plans to his right limb. 
These attributions were evident in statements such as “It has a mind of its own”, 
“Wants to be the boss”, “Its own way”, “Wants to dust the way it wants”, “It won’t 
go the way I want”, “Controls the towel while I dry myself”.” (Biran et al 2006, 567) 
In the so-called anarchic hand syndrome, patients are aware of their actions but they 
do not have the experience of those actions as their own (Marchetti & Della Sala 
1998). In these cases, patients receive sensory information given by the movements 
of the hand; however, the experience of that movement is not phenomenologically 
given as ‘their’ experience. From these cases we can raise a similar conclusion to the 
one offered in the last section. If we take the patients’ reports at face value, we can 
suggest that they experience action awareness with no sense of ownership (De 
vignemont 2007).  
Disrupted Experience of Conscious Thinking 
The phenomenon called ‘thought Insertion’ – TI henceforth – is widely recognized 
as one of the most significant symptoms of schizophrenia (first-rank symptoms; 
Mellor 1970)7. As a matter of fact, TI on its own is enough for a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia (F20, ICD-10; World Health Organization 1992). Smith (2013) refers 
to these cases as a disruption of the sense of ownership of intellectual experience 
i.e. ‘the experience of consciously thinking’. Smith suggests that:  
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[In normal situations] when I think through a problem I am aware of the problem 
itself, but it is also manifest to me that it is me that is thinking about it. That is, there 
is a sense of ownership over my episodes of conscious thinking (Smith 2013, 11) 
In contrast with normal cases, in TI, subject experiences thoughts which are not his 
own intruding into his mind (Mullins & Spence 2003). As Sims writes:  
“[In TI, a patient] experiences thoughts that do not have the feeling of familiarity, 
of being his own, but he feels that they have been put in his mind without his 
volition, from outside himself” (Sims 2003, 168) 
In these cases, patients do not experience a sense of mineness attached to the 
episode of conscious thinking. In TI, the ‘conscious thinking’ is not given as having 
the phenomenal property of mineness (Metzinger 2003). Quite often, patients 
suggest that the real owner has inserted the thought into their minds (Mellor 1970). 
The following reports are instances of TI: 
 
“I have never read nor heard them; they come unasked; I do not dare to think I am the source 
but I am happy to know of them without thinking them. They come at any moment like a 
gift and I do not dare to impart them as if they were my own.”  
(Jaspers 1963, 123) 
“I look out of the window and I think the garden looks nice and the grass looks cool. But the 
thoughts of Eammon Andrews come to my mind. There are no other thoughts there, only 
his. He treats my mind like a screen and flashes his thoughts onto it like you flash a picture”  
(Mellor 1970,  17) 
“Thoughts are put into my mind like ‘Kill God’. It’s just like my mind working, but it isn’t. 
They come from this chap, Chris. They’re his thoughts.”  
(Frith 1992,  66) 
“Sometimes it seemed to be her own thought ‘(…)but I don’t get the feeling that it is.’ She 
said her ‘own thought might say the same thing (…)But the feeling it isn’t the same . . . the 
feeling is that it is somebody else’s (…)” 
(Hoerl 2001,  190) 
“I didn’t hear these words as literal sounds, as though the houses were talking and I were 
hearing them; instead, the words just came into my head—they were ideas I was having. Yet 
I instinctively knew they were not my ideas. They belonged to the houses, and the houses 
had put them in my head” 
(Saks 2007,  29) 
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Taking the patients’ reports at face value, we can prima facie suggest that patients 
suffering from TI do not experience their thoughts as their own and therefore, from 
the first person perspective, they seem to lack a sense of mineness attached to 
intellectual experience8. In light of this, there are good reasons to think that the 
described cases provide plausible evidence to suppose that the ‘givenness’ of some 
experiences is not accompanied by a sense of mineness (as the SPC presupposes). 
We do not deny that there is ‘something it is like’ to be in the described states. It is 
quite natural and plausible to suggest that there is something it is like to experience 
an anarchic hand episode or an inserted thought that is qualitatively different from 
experiencing a full owned action or a full owned thought. However, the described 
cases show that the phenomenological sense of mineness can be dissociated from 
certain experiential modalities and therefore, this show that this property would 
not be integral to the ‘givenness’ of experience, as Zahavi proposes.  
The described cases show a disassociation between the metaphysics and the 
phenomenology of experience. The hand that a patient suffering from 
somatoparaphrenic delusion is aware of is necessarily the patient’s hand, however, 
the experience of it is not given as having a sense of mineness. The hand is not 
experienced as the patient’s hand. There seems to be a dissociation that occurs at 
the phenomenological level. Hence, taking at face value the reports, we cannot be 
completely sure that all experiences reveal a minimal pre-reflective form of self-
awareness (minimal self) as a constant structural element (SPC). This is because, on 
Zahavi’s view, the presence of a sense of mineness associated to each token 
experience is a condition for the self to be revealed in the experience. As we have 
seen to some patients certain experiences are not phenomenologically given as their 
own.  
Similar interpretations of these cases are found in different authors. For instance, 
Metzinger (2003) has suggested that cases of TI present patients alienated from their 
own thoughts for which they experience no sense of ownership or agency9. 
Explicitly referring to Zahavi’s view, Metzinger (2006) proposes that these types of 
cases demonstrate that the sense of mineness is not ‘an invariant dimension of the 
first-personal givenness’ as Zahavi claims (cf. Zahavi 2005, 143). In cases of thought 
insertion, patients might have introspective access to their own mental states, but 
still experience these states not only as being influenced or controlled by someone 
else, but as alien, as belonging to another. In line with this, Smith (2013) concludes 
from the revision of similar pathological cases that: ‘it seems reasonable to say that, 
in some sense at least, people can become alienated from their own bodily 
experience, action, memory and conscious thought’ (Smith 2013, 12). Based on this, 
he concludes that some pathological cases support the claim that some experiences 
can lack a sense of ownership. In conclusion, it seems plausible to say that it is 
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possible to have experiences with no sense of mineness attached to them, for this 
reason the main argument for the SPT is not compelling. 
Are cases of ‘disrupted sense of mineness’ an argument against the argument from 
the sense of mineness? Zahavi’s Reply 
Zahavi (2005) is well aware of the existence of pathological cases that challenge the 
argument from the sense of mineness. In this section I shall examine some of the 
main aspects of the reply offered by Zahavi and the problems that each aspect faces 
when it tries to deal with cases of disrupted episodes of conscious thinking. 
Zahavi claims that the most challenging pathological cases for his view come from 
the discussion of thought insertion in schizophrenia (Zahavi 2005, 3-4). However, 
although challenging, the author concludes that they do not show the disruption of 
the sense of mineness, but rather the disruption of the ‘sense of agency’10 (Zahavi 
2005, 143-144). Gallagher (2012, 132) distinguishes these two senses as follows: 
Sense of agency: The pre-reflective experience that I am the one who is causing or generating 
a movement or action or thought process. 
Sense of ownership: The pre-reflective experience that I am the one who is moving or 
undergoing an experience. 
Zahavi claims that in normal cases sense of agency and sense of ownership occur 
simultaneously, but in abnormal cases such the described ones, they can come 
apart. Zahavi claims: 
“Whereas the sense of agency refers to the sense of being the initiator or source of 
an action or thought, the sense of ownership refers to the sense that it is my body 
that is moving, that the experience I am living through are given as mine […] In 
cases of involuntary action [as in anarchic hand syndrome], the two [senses] can 
come apart. If I am pushed or if I am undergoing spasms, I will experience 
ownership of the movement(s)-I rather than somebody else, am the one moving-
but I will lack a sense of agency; I will lack the experience of being the agent or 
initiator of the movement” (Zahavi 2005, 143-144) 
This reply is based on the standard approach to thought insertion proposed by 
Stephens & Graham (2000) and Gallagher (2000a; 2000b)11. It is important to note 
that the distinction between agency and ownership was originally introduced by 
Stephens & Graham (2000) at the level of attributions and for this reason, in their 
discussion the term ‘sense of agency’ is treated as a result of a (reflective) disposition 
to make judgments about experience and not as an intrinsic (pre-reflective) 
property of the way in which experiences are given. However, Gallagher introduces 
this distinction at the experiential level by suggesting that the ‘sense of agency’ 
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belongs to the intrinsic –normal- appearance of experiences, i.e. pre-reflective12. 
Therefore, it is conceptually important to distinguish between the experience of 
mineness and the judgment (or attribution) of mineness in this discussion (De Hann 
& De Bruin 2010). Nevertheless, although this distinction introduces several 
interesting insights to the discussion, there are several reasons why it is 
problematic: 
First, the distinction looks plausible in cases of action awareness in which one can 
clearly phenomenologically distinguish between voluntary and involuntary 
movement, namely, as one being the author or having the intention of performing 
such actions. In fact, it is widely agreed that the standard approach to thought 
insertion establishes a parallelism between the loss of agency in cases of action with 
the loss of agency in thinking (Stephens & Graham 2000; Gallagher 2012). However, 
this is problematic. As in the case of actions, this model presuppose an ‘intention to 
think’ in any case in which the agent thinks (Mullins & Spence, 2003; Cermolacce, 
Naudin & Parnas, 2007). In cases of thought insertion, this ‘intention’ (T) would be 
disrupted resulting in a loss of the sense of agency. However, this leads to an infinite 
regress: The ‘intention’ (T) itself needs to be a type of thought that accompanies a 
thought (T*), and this type of thought (T*) needs to have a previous intention that 
is a type of thought (T**) and so on ad infinitum. Indeed, if every act of thinking is 
explained by a prior intention to think, the model leads to an infinite regress 
whenever and agent thinks. 
Secondly, the distinction cannot offer an account of the unique phenomenology of 
thought insertion, or at least: ‘it makes thought insertion lose all of its puzzling 
features’ (Bortolotti & Broome 2009, 217). The most puzzling aspect of the 
phenomenology of thought insertion is the ‘alien’ character of the thought that is 
experienced by the patient. In fact, this is the main aspect that distinguishes thought 
insertion from obsessive thought, thought withdrawal and influenced thinking 
(Mullens & Spence 2003). However, by explaining thought insertion on the basis of 
a disrupted sense of agency and a retained sense of mineness, Zahavi’s reply cannot 
account for the alien character of the phenomenon. In fact, this account cannot 
discriminate between normal cases of spontaneous thoughts, obsessive thoughts 
and cases of thought insertion. In everyday life, many thoughts pop into our mind 
without being preceded by specific intentions –as Zahavi’s distinction presupposes-
. However, this does not lead us to experience these thoughts as ‘not being mine’ 
i.e. with an alien character. Similarly, Jaspers (1963) claims that obsessive thoughts 
arise against the patient’s will. This leads the patient to perform different obsessive 
rituals as attempts to suppress the disrupting obsessive thought. Obsessions have 
been explained on the basis of a disrupted sense of agency and a retained sense of 
mineness. However, obsessive thoughts lack the ‘alien’ quality that inserted 
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thoughts present. Based on these two cases, it seems plausible to say that the 
distinction fails to offer a distinct account of the phenomenology of thought 
insertion different from intrusive thoughts and obsessions. This distinction cannot 
capture the characteristic conflict that a patient suffering from thought insertion 
faces. 
Trying to reply to these objections, Zahavi is forced to make an additional move to 
deal with the no-sense-of-mineness cases. This move is given by the author’s way 
of understanding experience. Let me explain this point. Following Williams James 
and against transparency philosophers, Zahavi claims that experiences are always 
something given to somebody; there are no ‘free-floating’ experiences13 (Gallagher 
2012). In experience –through them-, objects are given as having certain properties, 
‘as appearing in a certain way’ (Zahavi 2005, 121). There is therefore, a double 
dimension to the structure of the givenness of all experiences. According to Zahavi, 
there is an important difference between asking about the properties that a certain 
object appears as having (or what the object looks like to the observer) and asking 
about the properties of the experience of that certain object (or what the perceiving 
feels like to the perceiver) (Ibid 2005,  121). The former pertains to the properties of 
the perceived object -which Zahavi calls sensed-, while the latter pertains to the 
properties of the act of perceiving –which Zahavi calls sensing-. From this, Zahavi 
claims that: ‘We cannot be conscious of an object [a song] unless we are aware of 
the experience through which this object is made to appears [my listening]’ (Ibid,  
121) and exemplifies his point by claiming that: ‘The taste of the lemon is a 
qualitative feature of the lemon and must be distinguished from whatever qualities 
my tasting of the lemon has’ (Ibid 2005,  119). Finally, Zahavi suggests that although 
these two aspects –sensing and sensed- can be conceptually distinguished: ‘they 
cannot be detached and encountered in isolation from one another’ (Ibid,  123). 
Taking this into consideration, Zahavi concludes that in cases of disrupted sense of 
mineness in action awareness and experiences of conscious thinking (TI), the act of 
perceiving, acting or thinking (different modes of sensing) is always given as mine, 
i.e. I am the one undergoing those modes of sensing. In cases of thought insertion, 
the author concludes that the thought is not given as mine in the sense that I am not 
the source of that thought, but I am the one experiencing the thought as not being 
mine (Ibid, 144).  
Zahavi’s model of experience looks plausible in certain case, such as cases of visual 
perception. One can clearly distinguish between the way in which, say the chair is 
given (sensed) and the way in which my experience of the chair is given (sensing). 
The same applies in cases of bodily perception where one can distinguish, say my 
hand as having certain properties (sensed) and my experiencing (sensing) 14. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to say that this model deals in a more or less plausible 
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way with cases of disrupted bodily awareness. The model struggles to account for 
cases of somatoparaphrenic delusion, but for the sake of argument we can ignore 
this point here. However, this model leads us to some unavoidable problems when 
it is applied to cases of conscious thinking.  
First, as has already been pointed out by Metzinger (2006), a quite general worry is 
that Zahavi does not explain how the conceptual distinction between sensed and 
sensing grounds the distinction between the sense of agency and mineness. He 
explains neither why nor how the former supports the latter.  
Secondly and more relevant to our discussion, it is not clear if we can distinguish 
between the ‘givenness of a thought’ and the ‘givenness of my thinking the 
thought’. The distinction is equally problematic in cases of inserted emotions, where 
it is difficult to distinguish between ‘an emotion’ and ‘my experiencing the 
emotion’.  In fact, it is completely plausible that no separation between a ‘thought’ 
and ‘thinking the thought’ can be made. As Cermolacce, Naudin & Parnas (2007) 
suggest: ‘there is no separation here between thinking and a familiarity with what 
one is thinking’ (p. 709). This is because the thinking is the thought itself and –in 
cases of emotions- the experiencing is the emotion. Therefore, when a patient 
reports an experience of inserted thought it is not conceptually accurate to propose 
that the patient preserves a sense of mineness for her thinking. This is because in 
cases of thought insertion, it is the act of thinking (the thought) that is not given as 
the patient’s act of thinking (thought).   
Finally and more importantly, this model of experience leads us to (yet) another 
infinite regress. Let’s understand ‘thinking’ as a case of ‘intellectual experience’, just 
as Zahavi seems to do (Zahavi 2005, 124). Based on Zahavi’s model, we need to 
distinguish between the way in which a thought is given (T: sensed) and the way in 
which my thinking a thought is given (TT: sensing). In cases of thought insertion 
(T) would not be given as mine, but (TT) still given as mine. This distinction 
becomes problematic because ‘thinking the thought’ (TT) is a type of experience and 
by definition, we need to distinguish between the givenness of (TT) and the 
givenness of my thinking (TT) i.e. (TT*) and so on ad infinitum. Therefore, if we 
understand conscious thinking as a case of intellectual experience, Zahavi’s 
distinction leads to an infinite regress whenever I have an intellectual experience. 
Conclusion 
Dan Zahavi develops an interesting and philosophically detailed 
phenomenological approach to the relationship between phenomenal 
consciousness and self-awareness. In doing so, he suggests that conscious 
experience has a self-presenting character (SPC) via a sense of mineness. This essay 
has offered a philosophical assessment of his main argument, focusing on the claim 
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that no experience lacks a sense of mineness. Roughly speaking, Zahavi proposes 
that all experiences include a sense of mineness as a part of the way in which they 
are given. However, reports of people suffering from different pathologies 
challenge this idea. From the revision of cases of somatoparaphrenic delusions, 
alien hand syndrome and thought insertion, among others, we concluded some 
experiences can lack sense of mineness. Zahavi is well aware of the existence of 
these cases and he elaborates a reply based on the standard approach to thought 
insertion. However, the author’s reply presents several philosophical problems, 
especially in relation to cases of thought insertion. In analysing cases of thought 
insertion, Zahavi makes a distinction between the sense of agency and the sense of 
mineness, which establishes an implausible parallelism between the 
phenomenology of action and conscious thinking, eventually leading to an infinite 
regress. In addition, his distinction cannot discriminate between the 
phenomenology of obsession and everyday disruptive thoughts from cases of 
disruption of conscious thinking thought. The distinction explains neither the 
uniqueness of the phenomenology of thought insertion nor the conflict that patients 
feel when they experience this abnormal experience. Trying to save his argument 
from these kinds of objections, Zahavi makes a problematic distinction between ‘the 
givenness of an object’ (sensed) and the ‘givenness of my experience of the object’ 
(sensing). This distinction is plausible in cases of perceptual experience, but it is 
conceptually inaccurate when applied to cases of conscious thinking and leads to 
another infinite regress. Finally, based on the philosophical examination offered in 
this essay, I conclude that although the standard reply adds interesting elements to 
the discussion, it is philosophically problematic in cases of thought insertion. For 
this reason, we may conclude that the main argument given by Zahavi in support 
of the SPC is implausible. This does not refute the SPC, but shows that stronger 
arguments are needed to defend it.  
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1   I will follow Dan Zahavi – the main defender of SPC – and refer to this property as the sense 
of mineness and the sense of ownership interchangeably 
2 This must not be taken as a metaphysical claim. In his project, Zahavi (2005) takes a 
Husserlian phenomenological position towards the concepts he wants to explain. This 
means that Zahavi tries to avoid any theoretical and metaphysical presuppositions 
regarding the structure of conscious experience, making claims only from the way they 
appear 
3  This raises further questions about a possible metaphysical identification of the experiential 
stream with a ‘minimal self’ (Zahavi 2011). However, our discussion will be focused on the 
phenomenological discussion. See note 2 
4 The author uses the terms ‘self-awareness’ and ‘self-consciousness’ interchangeably (see: 
Zahavi 2005, 225) 
5  It is important to note that here ‘implicit’ means ‘pre-reflective’ 
6  Moro, Zampini & Aglioti 2004, 440 write about cases of alien hand syndrome: “Stimuli were 
detected in all trials even though the hand was still felt as belonging to another person. 
Specifically asked about how it was possible to perceive stimuli delivered to another’s hand, 
the patient reported that ‘many strange things can happen in life.’ “ 
7 The history of the term is full of disagreement and philosophical discussion. For a nice 
summary of this history (see: Mullins & Spence 2003)  
8  A similar case can be found in cases of inserted emotions in which patients refer to the way 
that certain emotional states are given to them not as their own states: I cry, tears roll down 
my cheeks and I look unhappy, but I have a cold anger because they’re using me in this way, 
and it’s not me who’s unhappy, but they’re projecting unhappiness onto my brain. They 
project upon me laughter, for no reason, and you have no idea how terrible it is to laugh 
and look happy and know it’s not you, but their emotions’. (Mellor 1970, 17) 
9  The sense of agency is defined as: “The pre-reflective experience that I am the one who is 
causing or generating a movement or action or thought process” (Gallagher 2012, 132). 
10 For a specific discussion about the definitions of this term, see: De Haan & Leon de Bruin 
(2009) 
11 For critical discussion of this approach, see: Bortolotti & Broome (2009) and Martin & 
Pacherie (2013) 
12 In his reply, Zahavi explicitly adopts Gallagher’s distinction (See: Zahavi 2005, 143-144) 
13 James (1980 I, 225) claims that: ‘Every thought is part of a personal consciousness […] the 
universal fact is not ‘feelings and thoughts exists’, but ‘I think’ and ‘I feel’, [yet] to give an 
accurate account of [this] is the most difficult of philosophical tasks’  
14 People like De Haan & De Bruin (2009) will criticize this idea 
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